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189, 475 A.2d 528 (1984).
The media wields enormous power in American society. A
single investigative expos6, front page headline, or exclusive
story on the nightly news can catapult an individual to the pinnacle of success or, conversely, plummet an individual into the
depths of ignominy.' When the media abuses its power and damages a person's reputation, that person has the right to redress
his injury by bringing an action for defamation.2 In a majority of
jurisdictions, however, if an individual commences a defamation
action and then dies during the pendency of the suit, the action
immediately abates.3 There is, nevertheless, a growing trend to
I See, e.g., R. WOODWARD & C. BERNSTEIN, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (1974)
(news article about third-rate burglary eventually leads to resignation of President
Richard M. Nixon).
2 According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, "[a] communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with
him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). The elements listed by the
Restatement as essential to create liability for defamation are: "(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third
party; (c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and
(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence
of special harm caused by the publication." Id. § 558.
Libel is a species of defamation and "consists of the publication of defamatory
matter by written or printed words, by its embodiment in physical form or by any
other form of communication that has the potentially harmful qualities characteristic of written or printed words." Id. § 568(1). Slander, a second species of defamation, "consists of the publication of defamatory matter by spoken words, transitory
gestures or by any form of communication other than [libel]." Id. § 568(2). Factors that are considered in distinguishing libel from slander include "[t]he area of
dissemination, the deliberate and premeditated character of its publication, and the
persistence of the defamation." Id. § 568(3). For a general discussion of libel and
slander, see Hofer, Libel Law in the Twenty-First Century: Defamation and the Electronic
Media, 3 CoMM/ENT 379 (1981); Comment, The Constitutional Law of Defamation: Are
All Speakers Protected Equally?, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 149 (1983).
3 See ALA. CODE § 6-5-462 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-3110 (1981);
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-901, -902 (1965); CAL. PROB. CODE § 573 (West Cum. Supp.
1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-101 (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3701
(1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-101 (1973 & Supp. VII 1980); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 663-7 (1955); IDAHO CODE § 5-327 (1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110-1/2, § 27-6
(1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-1-1 (Bums Cum. Supp. 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-1802 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 34-1219 (1975); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 428
(West 1963); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-301(a) (1974); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 228, § 1 (West 1958); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 573.01, -.02 (West Cum.
Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.030 (Vernon 1953); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1402
(1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-2-4 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-1 (1973); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 28-01-26.1 (1974); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2311.21 (Page 1980);
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the contrary.4 Recently, in Canino v. New York News, Inc. ,' New
Jersey joined the minority of states that allow actions for defamation to survive 6 the death of the plaintiff.'
James Canino and Alvin Raphael were commercial builders,
general contractors, and owners of low and middle-income housing in West New York, New Jersey.8 On October 21, 1979, the
New York Daily News published an article written by David Hardy,
which detailed state and Federal investigations into the operations of the New Jersey Housing Finance Agency. 9 The article
described a web of corruption, through which millions of dollars
in housing funds were being siphoned off by reputed mob-connected contractors working in collusion with prominent governmental officials."0 James Canino and Alvin Raphael were
identified as two of the contractors who participated in the housOKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1052 (West Cum. Supp. 1984-1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 9-1-5, -6 (1970); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-5-90 (Law. Co-op. 1976); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 20-5-102 (1980); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-8a (1981); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-4-102
(1977). For a discussion of survival statutes which exclude libel and slander, see
Comment, Challengingthe Exclusion of Libel and Slanderfrom Survival Statutes, 1984 U.
ILL. L. REV. 423.
4 The following state statutes permit libel actions to survive the death of the
plaintiff: ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.050 (1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-599 (1975); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 46.021 (West 1969); GA. CODE ANN. § 3-501 (1978); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 611.20 (West 1950); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 3-816 (1977); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 600.2921 (West Cum. Supp. 1984-1985); Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-7-233
(1973); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-501 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.100 (1973);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 556.9 (1974); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-3.2
(McKinney 1967 & Cum. Supp. 1984-1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 115.305 (1980); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 15-4-1, -2 (1969); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5525
(Vernon 1958); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-7 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1452
(1974 & Cum. Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 8.01-25 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.20.046 (1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.01 (West 1983). Defamation actions also
survive in Pennsylvania as a result of the decision by its supreme court in Moyer v.
Phillips, 462 Pa. 395, 341 A.2d 441 (1975). In that decision, the court held that the
statute was unconstitutional because it bore no rational relationship to the objective of the statute. Moyer, 462 Pa. at 398, 341 A.2d at 445. For discussion of the
Moyer decision see, Note, Moyer v. Phillips: Survival Legislation and JudicialActivism in
Pennsylvania, 61 IOWA L. REV. 623 (1975). The Pennsylvania Legislature has since
amended this statute. See 20 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 3371 (Purdon Cum. Supp.
1984-1985).
5 96 N.J. 189, 475 A.2d 528 (1984).
6 "Survival refers to the continued life of a cause of action after the death of the
person originally entitled [to maintain the action]." Comment, Inadequacies of English and State Survival Legislation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1008, 1008 n.l (1935).
7 See Canino, 96 N.J. at 189, 475 A.2d at 528.
8 Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent at 4, Canino v. New York News, Inc., No. A
5533-81T1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), aff'd, 96 N.J. 189, 475 A.2d 528 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Plaintiff].
9 Id.
10 Canino, 96 N.J. at 190, 475 A.2d at 528. The article appeared in the New
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ing agency scandal."
One year later, Canino and Raphael commenced a libel action against the New York Daily News and David Hardy. 12 The
complaint disputed Hardy's claim that authorities had linked
Canino and Raphael to a NewJersey crime family."3 In addition,
the complaint averred that the publication of the libelous statement was injurious to Canino's and Raphael's good names and
reputations, and had caused injury to their businesses, resulting
in economic hardship.' 4 The defendants denied the allegations,
claiming that the publication of the article was protected under
the first amendment to the United States Constitution.'

5

Jersey section of the Sunday edition of the New York Daily News and was entitled
Report Corruption in Housing Agency. The article read, in pertinent part:
After more than four months of probing the scandal-ridden New
Jersey Housing Finance Agency, state and federal lawmen say they they
[sic] have uncovered 'a virtual web of corruption' whereby millions of
dollars in state housing funds were being ripped off by reputedly mobconnected contractors who allegedly worked in collusion with prominent state Democratic party figures.
'It's incredible how the mob managed to gain a virtual monopoly on
FHA projects,' a high-ranking investigation source told the- [sic] Daily
News.
'The way things worked, until last summer, it was almost impossible
for an honest contractor or architect to get a piece of the action.'
Brief of Defendant-Appellant exhibit Da-I, Canino v. New York News, Inc., No. A
5533-81T1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), aft'd, 96 N.J. 189, 475 A.2d 528 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Brief of Defendant].
I Canino, 96 NJ. at 190, 475 A.2d at 528. The allegedly defamatory statements
"
read as follows:
Although no indictments have been returned as yet, it is known that
Gov. Byrne ordered William L. Johnston fired from the post of HFA
executive director becauseJohnston overlooked the mishandling of $1.8
million in housing funds by the owners of two HFA projects in West
New York. Those owners, James Canino of Englewood Cliffs and Alvin
Raphael of, [sic] Tenafly, have been linked by authorities to the Newarkbased crime family headed by Ruggerio (Richie the Boot) Boiardo.
Brief of Defendant, supra note 10, exhibit Da-I.
12 Canino, 96 N.J. at 190, 475 A.2d at 528. In New Jersey, actions for libel must
be commenced within one year of the date of the publication of the allegedly
libelous statement. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-3 (West 1952 & Cum. Supp. 19841985).
13 Canino, 96 N.J. at 190, 475 A.2d at 528.
14 Id. The complaint also alleged that the article had caused plaintiffs and their
families to be held in public scorn, humiliation, and ridicule, as well as to suffer
great emotional distress. Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at Da20-22,
Canino v. New York News, Inc., No. L 9436-80 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.), afd, No.
A 5533-81T1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), aff'd, 96 N.J. 189, 475 A.2d 528 (1984).
15 Canino, 96 N.J. at 190, 475 A.2d at 528. Defendants also pleaded truth and
fair comment as defenses. Id. Pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, "[o]ne
who publishes a defamatory statement of fact is not subject to liability for defamation if the statement is true." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (1977). In
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During the pendency of the action, Alvin Raphael suffered a
heart attack and died. 16 In December 1981, an order was entered, which allowed Kathleen Raphael, widow and executrix of
17
the estate of Alvin Raphael, to be substituted as party-plaintiff.
An amended complaint was filed by Mrs. Raphael in her representative capacity.1 8 The defendants subsequently moved to dismiss the amended complaint on the basis that the New Jersey
survival statute' 9 did not provide for continuance of a libel action
20
after the death of the plaintiff.
21
The trial court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss.
In an oral opinion, Judge Edward J. Van Tassel noted that dismissal of the estate's action would not be consistent with the re22
cent expansion of litigants' rights in New Jersey tort law.
Relying principally on the decision in Weller v. Home News Publishing Co. ,21 judge Van Tassel allowed Kathleen Raphael to continue
addition, the media has the privilege of fair comment. This privilege, according to
the Restatement, "applie[s] only to an expression of opinion and not to a false statement of fact." Id. § 566 comment a.
16 Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 8, at 4.
17 Brief of Defendant, supra note 10, at 3.
18 Canino, 96 N.J. at 190, 475 A.2d at 528. If Mrs. Raphael had asserted an individual claim, the supreme court would have been confronted with the additional
issue of whether an individual can recover for defamation when the libelous statement makes no reference to him or her. In Durski v. Chaneles, 175 N.J. Super. 418,
419 A.2d 1134 (App. Div. 1980), the appellate division held that an indispensable
prerequisite of a defamation action is that the defamatory statement must be of and
concerning the complaining party. Durski, 175 N.J. Super. at 420, 419 A.2d at
1134.
19 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-3 (West Cum. Supp. 1984-1985).
20 Brief of Defendant, supra note 10, at 3. The defendants, in oral argument on
the motion to dismiss, relied heavily on the decision in Alpaugh v. Conkling, 88
N.J.L. 64, 95 A. 740 (Sup. Ct. 1915), wherein it was held that, under the survival
statute, libel actions abated upon the death of the plaintiff. See Canino, 96 N.J. at
190, 475 A.2d at 528. See infra text accompanying notes 66-69 for a discussion of
the Alpaugh decision.
21 Canino, 96 N.J. at 190, 475 A.2d at 529.
22 Brief of Defendant, supra note 10, at Da 53-54 (copy of transcript of motion to
dismiss). For cases illustrating this recent expansion, see Alfone v. Sarno, 87 N.J.
99, 432 A.2d 857 (1981) (judgment for damages in personal injury suit brought by
decedent during her lifetime did not preclude later action for wrongful death on
behalf of her heirs or dependents); Portee v.Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980)
(mother who watched her seven-year old son suffer and die could recover damages
for mental and emotional distress, even though she had not been subjected to any
physical harm); Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965) (physical impact
not prerequisite for recovery where fright causes substantial bodily injury or sickness); Hume v. Bayer, 178 N.J. Super. 310, 428 A.2d 966 (App. Div. 1981) (existence or nonexistence of underlying independent cause of action not essential to
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
23 112 N.J. Super. 502, 271 A.2d 738 (Law Div. 1970). See infra text accompanying notes 77-84 for a discussion of the WelLer decision.
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the libel action commenced by her deceased husband.2 4 In an
unreported decision, the appellate division affirmed. 25 On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts
and held that, under the state survival statute, a suit for defamation survives the death of the individual claiming injury.2 6
At common law, all tort actions abated upon the death of
either the plaintiff or the defendant.27 That rule is embodied in
the Latin maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona-the "right of

action dies with the person. ' ' 28 Although the tangled history of
the rule cannot be traced with certainty, most legal historians
concur that it developed primarily as a result of the confusion
between civil damage actions and the punitive aspects of criminal
proceedings. 29 Generally, the common law provided that when a
criminal defendant died, the proceedings terminated because a
defendant could not be punished after he was dead.3" Because
the common law characterized the recovery of civil damages as a
quasi-criminal remedy, death had an analogous effect in civil actions." When either the victim or the transgressor died, the reasons for redressing the personal wrong-vengeance and
punishment-ceased to exist, and the tort action therefore
abated.3 2 Moreover, the representative of the decedent's estate
could not maintain the suit because he was not personally involved in the wrong and thus had no legal interest in avenging
the injury.33
24 Brief of Defendant, supra note 10, at Da54 (copy of transcript of motion to
dismiss).
25 Canino, 96 N.J. at 191, 475 A.2d at 529.
26 Id. at 195, 475 A.2d at 531-32. -To alleviate the concern of potential media
defendants, the Canino court emphasized that the survival of defamation actions did
not implicate first amendment values. See id. at 198, 475 A.2d at 532. Presumably,
the Canino holding would also apply to a defendant who died during the pendency
of a libel action.
27 Hayden v. Vreeland, 37 N.J.L. 372, 373 (Sup. Ct. 1875). If a cause of action
did survive, a "new suit was necessary." Id.
28 Canino, 96 N.J. at 191, 475 A.2d at 528.
29 Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the Common Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. REV. 605,
607 (1960); see W. PROSSER, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 126, at 898901 (4th ed. 1971); Winfield, Death as Affecting Liability in Tort, 29 COLUM. L. REV.
239, 249-50 (1929).
30 W. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 898; see Smedley, supra note 29, at 608; Winfield, supra note 29, at 249.
31 Smedley, supra note 29, at 608.
32 Id. But cf. id. at 609 (when "function of damage awards [became] compensatory rather than punitive," underlying reason for actio personalis moritur cum persona
ceased to exist).
33 Id. at 608. As one commentator observed, "executors and administrators are
representatives of the temporal property [consisting of] the debts and goods of the
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During the reign of King Edward III, statutes were enacted,
which modified that ancient doctrine.1 4 Those statutes authorized executors of estates to maintain actions against persons who
had converted the decedent's personal property during his lifetime. 3 5 Viewed as remedial legislation, the statutes were applied
liberally and, by the early nineteenth century, tort actions for
damage to personal property survived the owner's death while
suits based upon injuries to one's person or one's incorporeal
interests did not.3 6
In the United States, the harsh effects of the English common law doctrine were further ameliorated by statutes that provided for the continuance of tort actions that were based upon
injury to the person.3 ' For example, in 1848, the New Jersey
Legislature enacted a wrongful death statute,38 which "created a
'new right of action' in the personal representatives of a person
who died as a result of the 'wrongful act, neglect or default' of
another."' 39 In addition, in 1855, New Jersey adopted a survival
statute, which generally provided executors and administrators
with a cause of action for "any trespass done to the person or
property" of the decedent.4 ° It was the interpretation of that
deceased, but not of their wrongs, except where those wrongs operate to the temporal injury of their personal estate." Id. at 608 n.21.
34 Winfield, supra note 29, at 243.
35 Id. These statutes did not apply to injuries "to a man's person, freehold, or
personal reputation," nor did they apply to "personal representatives of a deceased
tortfeasor." Id.
36 W. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 899. Even after the enactment of these statutes,
the common law doctrine still applied to personal actions for trespass, battery, and
slander. Winfield, supra note 29, at 247.
37 Canino, 96 N.J. at 192, 475 A.2d at 530.
38 See id. at 192-93, 475 A.2d at 530. The present version of the wrongful death
statute is set forth in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-1 to -6 (West 1952 & Cum. Supp.
1984-1985).
39 Ehrlich v. Merritt, 96 F.2d 251, 253 (3d Cir. 1938). The statute permits the
personal representative of a deceased injured party "to maintain an action against
the tort-feasor for damages to be distributed to the widow [or] the next of kin of the
deceased." Id.
40 The New Jersey survival statute provides that:
Executors and administrators may have an action for any trespass
done to the person or property, real or personal, of their testator or
intestate against the trespasser, and recover their damages as their testator or intestate would have had if he was living.
In those actions based upon the wrongful act, neglect, or default of
another, where death resulted from injuries for which the deceased
would have had a cause of action if he had lived, the executor or administrator may recover all reasonable funeral and burial expenses in addition to damages accrued during the lifetime of the deceased.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-3 (West 1952 & Cum. Supp. 1984-1985).
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phrase-" trespass done to the person or property"-that was the
focus of the Canino decision. 4 '
The first decision to interpret the relevant statutory phrase
was Ten Eyck v. Runk. 42 In Ten Eyck, the plaintiff brought an action on the case 4 3 to recover for water damage to his land, which
was caused by overflow from the defendant's dam. 44 The de-

fendant died during the pendency of the action and his executors
sought to have it dismissed. 45 The issue before the New Jersey
Supreme Court was whether, under the survival statute, the suit
survived the death of the defendant. 46 The supreme court held
that the action descended to the decedent's legal
representatives ."

In reaching its decision, the Ten Eyck court construed the
word "trespass" in the survival statute as being equivalent to the
meaning of the word tort, "embrac[ing] every infraction of a
legal right" whether the damages were direct and immediate, or
indirect and consequential.48 Recognizing the remedial purpose
of the survival statute, the court stated that there was no moral
precept or principle of public policy that "justif[ied] the continuance of a rule which grounded a man's right to recover for an
injury to his person or estate . . .on the contingency [that] the
party injured surviv[e] to the date of thejudgment. ' ' 49 The court

determined that the statute should be construed liberally in order to advance a remedy that would assail that imperfection in
the common law. 50 Furthermore, the court observed that if the
statute was held applicable only to torts that arose out of a direct,
41 See infra text accompanying notes 95-104 for the Canino court's interpretation
of the relevant statutory phrase. See also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Laval, 131 N.J. Eq.
23, 23 A.2d 908 (Ch. Div. 1942), for a discussion of the history and litigation surrounding the survival statute.
42 31 N.J.L. 428 (Sup. Ct. 1866). Although Ten Eyck did not involve an action for
libel, the case is significant because of the court's interpretation of the survival
statute.
43 Trespass on the case is that "form of action, at common law, adapted to the
recovery of damages for some injury resulting to a party from the wrongful act of
another, unaccompanied by direct or immediate force, or which is the indirect...
consequence of a defendant's act." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1347 (5th ed. 1979).
44 Ten Eyck, 31 N.J.L. at 428.
45 See id.
46 Id. See supra note 40 for the text of the survival statute.
47 Ten Eyck, 31 N.J.L. at 432.
48 Id. at 430. The court noted that "[i]n this sense [the term trespass] comprehended not only forcible wrongs, where the damages were direct and immediate,
but also acts, the consequences of which made them tortious." Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
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as opposed to an indirect, injury to person or property, then
"one-half the evil of the old law [would remain] unaffected." 5
Accordingly, the Ten Eyck court concluded that the effect of the
survival statute was to give an injured party's legal representative
a right to continue a suit "for any injurious act of a suable
nature."52
In 1877, the supreme court was again confronted with interpreting the statutory phrase "trespass done to the person or
property. 5 3 In Noice, Administratrix v. Brown,5 4 the defendant
contended that, under the survival statute, an action brought by a
father for the seduction of his daughter did not survive the father's death. 55 The court rejected the defendant's argument, reasoning that the phrase "trespass done to the person" was
sufficiently comprehensive to embrace personal actions for injuries to feelings, inasmuch as "feelings [are] as much a part of the
person as the physical frame."'5 6 The court concluded that because the decedent's personal feelings had been injured by the
seduction of his daughter, the action fell within the scope of the
statute and therefore survived.57
The decision of the Noice court, however, was based on an
additional factor. 58 The court noted that the seduction of the decedent's daughter had affected the decedent's property rights because her injury caused him to lose "a service of some pecuniary
value." 59 The loss therefore was said to affect the value of the
Id.
Id. at 431; cf. Tichenor v. Hayes, 41 N.J.L. 193 (Sup. Ct. 1879) (action for
deceit in tort will descend to personal representative of deceased wrongdoer). But
cf. Meyer v. Peter, 9 N.J. Misc. 1309, 157 A. 250 (Sup. Ct. 1931) (action for malicious prosecution abates upon death of plaintiff in absence of allegation of special
damages to property rights).
53 Noice, Administratrix v. Brown, 39 N.J.L. 569, 571 (Sup. Ct. 1877).
54 39 N.J.L. 569 (Sup. Ct. 1877).
55 See id. at 570.
56 Id. at 571. The court noted that "[t]he offences of seduction and libel, where
no special damages are laid, are, obviously, strictly personal, being remedies,
mainly, for wounded feelings." Id. The court further explained that "no reason
appears why an injury to [feelings] is not as much a tort to the person as an assault
would be." Id.
57 Id. The supreme court additionally opined that the case was within the spirit,
as well as the language, of the statute. Id.
58 See id.
59 Id. Historically, under the feudal system, because children were subject to
parental dominion, they "acquired some of the characteristics of property or chattels." W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATZ, AMERICAN FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION 495 (1983).
Similarly, in feudal times, parents had a proprietary right in the services of their
children. Id.
51
52
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decedent's personal estate. 60 Concluding that such an injury to
property rights should not go unpunished, the court stated that
6
the action should survive on public policy grounds. '
In 1899, the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals, in
Cooper v. Shore Electric Co.," significantly circumscribed the Noice
decision. Although Cooper involved an action under the state's
wrongful death statute,6 3 the reasoning in the opinion would
later prove pivotal in interpreting the survival statute in the context of libel actions. 6' The Cooper court, in determining whether a
wrongful death action abated upon the death of the individual for
whose benefit the suit was brought, construed Noice as standing
for the proposition that it was injury to tangible property rights
that gave an action the quality of survivorship.6 5
Alpaugh v. Conkling6 6 was the first New Jersey case to present
the issue of the descendibility of defamation actions. In Alpaugh,
the defendant died after an action for slander had been commenced against her. 67 The plaintiff, maintaining that the action
did not abate under the state's survival statute, moved to substitute the personal representative of the deceased as defendant.68
The court refused to allow the substitution, holding that the statutory phrase "trespass done to the person" did not encompass
60

Noice, 39 N.J.L. at 571.

61 Id. In the words of the court, "[t]he damages being partly punitive, the action

should survive [so] that the punishment may fall on the wrong-doer." Id.
62 63 N.J.L. 558,44 A. 633 (1899).
63 See id. at 558-59, 44 A. at 633.
64 See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
65 Cooper, 63 N.J.L. at 562, 44 A. at 634-35. The Cooper opinion was a travesty, as
the court misconstrued both Noice and Hayden v. Vreeland, 37 N.J.L. 372 (Sup. Ct.
1875). The Cooper court interpreted Hayden as holding that a purely personal action
did not survive death. Cooper, 63 N.J.L. at 562, 44 A. at 634. But the Hayden court
actually held that a breach of a promise of marriage could not be maintained not
because the injury was purely personal, but because the action was in contract and,
therefore, the survival statute did not apply. See Hayden, 37 N.J.L. at 379. In a
similar vein, Noice was interpreted by the Cooper court as allowing a tort action to
survive only if it affected the property rights of the deceased. See Cooper, 63 N.J.L. at
562, 44 A. at 634-35. The Cooper court, however, ignored the reasoning at the beginning of the Noice opinion that an "injury to the [feelings of a person] is as much
a tort to the person as an assault would be." See Noice, 39 N.J.L. at 571 (Noice court
reasoning). As a result of its faulty interpretation of both Hayden and Noice, the
Cooper court determined that where the injury was purely personal the action did
not survive, but where the injury related to property rights, the action did survive.
See Cooper, 63 N.J.L. at 562, 44 A. at 635. It was this reasoning which the court in
Alpaugh v. Conkling, 88 N.J.L. 64, 95 A. 618 (Sup. Ct. 1915), later applied to libel
actions. See infra text accompanying notes 66-75.
66 88 N.J.L. 64, 95 A. 618 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
67 Id. at 65, 95 A. at 618.
68 Id., 95 A. at 619.
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actions for libel and slander in the absence of damage to tangible
69
property rights.
In rendering its decision, the court severely restricted Ten
Eyck. 7" Writing for the court, Justice Parker reasoned that, because Ten Eyck had presented an injury to property, that court
had merely interpreted the word "trespass," without construing
' 'T
the meaning of the phrase "done to the person or property. 7
In analyzing whether there had been an injury to Alpaugh's person, Justice Parker glossed over the reasoning in Noice that feelings, as well as one's physical frame, were a part of the person.7 2
Rather, he found more persuasive the Cooper court's interpretation of Noice-that the survival of an action was dependent upon
the presence of a tangible injury. Justice Parker observed that,
although Alpaugh's reputation might have been injured, he had
suffered no tangible harm from the allegedly slanderous remarks.7 ' The court thus concluded that, under the survival statute, the plaintiff's action terminated at the defendant's death.7 5
The Alpaugh decision represented the undisputed law in New
Jersey 76 until the 1970 decision in Weller v. Home News Publishing
Co. 7 7 In that case, the plaintiff had died while her libel action was
pending, and her personal representatives sought to be substituted. 7' Relying on Alpaugh, the defendant argued that the libel
Id. at 67, 95 A. at 619.
See id. at 66, 95 A. at 619.
Id. See supra text accompanying notes 48-52 for the Ten Eyck court's construction of the relevant statutory phrase.
72 See Alpaugh, 88 N.J.L. at 66, 95 A. at 619.
73 See id.
74 See id. at 67, 95 A. at 619.
75 Id. The court in Alpaugh also examined statutes and court decisions from
other states in reaching its decision. Id. In addition, the court left open the question of whether libel or slander actions would survive in the presence of allegations
of special damages to property. See id.
76 E.g., Palmisano v. News Syndicate Co., 130 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (libel
action abates); see also Patrick v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 156 F. Supp. 336 (D.N.J.
1957) (applying Alpaugh, court determined that action for malicious prosecution
abated).
77 112 N.J. Super. 502, 271 A.2d 738 (Law Div. 1970).
78 Id. at 504-05, 271 A.2d at 739. Mrs. Weller, the plaintiff, who was a paying
patient in a hospital, was suffering from a heart ailment. Id. at 504, 271 A.2d at
739. The hospital's public relations director prepared a series of articles for the
hospital's newspaper on charity patient care. Id. Mrs. Weller's profile was used in a
picture of "Prudence Grandmom Pickett," a fictitious destitute charity patient,
which accompanied one of the articles. Id. at 504-05, 271 A.2d at 739. Mrs. Weller
claimed that she was libeled by the picture and accompanying article. See id. After
her death, her daughter and son-in-law, as her personal representatives, sought to
continue the suit. Id.
69
70
71
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action had abated upon the plaintiffs death. 79 In an opinion
written by Judge Furman, the court rejected the defendant's argument and specifically stated that Alpaugh should no longer be
followed.8" The court refused to adopt the dichotomy recognized
in Alpaugh, between tangible damage to one's person and intangible damage to one's reputation, commenting that such a distinction was "purely arbitrary." 8 ' Rather, employing language
reminiscent of Ten Eyck, Judge Furman indicated that the phrase
"trespass done to the person" should be interpreted broadly. 82
The state's survival statute, the court determined, "preserved a
decedent's cause of action for [any] trespass to person or property

. . .

without stated exceptions." 8

Therefore, the court held

that Mrs. Weller's libel action did not abate on her death.8 4
Thirteen years later, the descendibility of defamation actions
under New Jersey's survival statute was examined by the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey in MacDonald
v. Time, Inc.85 Because the New Jersey Supreme Court had never
rendered a controlling decision on the issue, the district court in
MacDonald was obliged to discern how that court would have
ruled on the question. 6 Judge Sarokin began his analysis by
commenting on both the awesome power of the press in contemporary society and its concomitant ability to destroy an individId. at 505, 271 A.2d at 739.
Id. at 505-07, 271 A.2d at 739-40. The Weller court stated that it did not follow the Alpaugh decision because that decision had been rendered by a court of
"like jurisdiction at nisi prius and [thus] need not be followed." Id. at 505, 271 A.2d
at 739. In addition, citing cases from other jurisdictions, the court asserted that if
Alpaugh were followed the result would be repressive and "out of keeping with the
preferable trend outside New Jersey." Id. (citing Emmanuel v. Bovino, 26 Conn.
Supp. 356, 223 A.2d 541 (Super. Ct. 1966); Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56
N.Y.S. 2d 910 (Sup. Ct. 1945)).
81 Id. at 506, 271 A.2d at 740. The Weller court noted that "damages for mental
suffering and nervous anguish were recoverable . . . in several causes of action
arising out of trespass on the case." Id. In addition, the court reasoned that there
was no logical basis for the Alpaugh court's conclusion in dictum that defamation
actions involving property or monetary losses would survive, whereas defamation
actions alleging damage to feelings or reputation would not. Id. at 506-07, 271
A.2d at 739-40.
82 See id. at 506, 271 A.2d at 740. In Justice Furman's words, "[t]o construe
trespass to person as not encompassing libel ... is to import a limitation into the
survival statute which is not expressed, The term 'trespass' in the statute is equated
with 'tort.' " Id.
83 Id. at 506, 271 A.2d at 739.
84 Id. at 507, 271 A.2d at 739.
85 554 F. Supp. 1053 (D.N.J. 1983).
86 Id. at 1055.
79

80
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ual's reputation.8 He noted that, in view of that power and of
the resultant need to provide a forum in which to vindicate one's
reputation, there was no just reason why a libel action should not
survive the plaintiff's death.8 8 Judge Sarokin reasoned that "[t]o
say that a man's . . . reputation dies with him is to ignore the

realities of life and the bleak legacy which he leaves behind."8 9
Consequently, the court rejected the contrived, technical fiction
that a claim for a damaged leg survived death but a claim for a
damaged reputation did not. 0
Judge Sarokin next reviewed the decisions in Ten Eyck,
Cooper, Alpaugh, and Weller, and determined that the Weller analysis was the most persuasive. 9 ' Weller, he reasoned, was consistent
with the increasing recognition within the state of the right to be
compensated for injuries to feelings and to reputation. 92 In light
of that trend, and cognizant of the necessity to counter the power
of the modern media, the court 93held that defamation actions survived the death of the plaintiff.
It was against this background that the New Jersey Supreme
Court rendered its decision in Canino, which conclusively established that, under the state's survival statute, libel actions survive
to the personal representative upon the death of the defamed.94
The Canino court determined that libel and slander are injuries to
in the statutory phrase
the person and are therefore subsumed
"trespass done to the person." '9 5 In so holding, the court rejected the distinction, which was recognized by the courts in
Cooper and Alpaugh,96 between tangible damage to one's person
or property and intangible damage to one's reputation.97 The
court instead approved the reasoning in MacDonald and conId. at 1054.
88 Id. at 1054-55. Judge Sarokin observed that "[i]f this case is not tried, [the
plaintiff's] survivors will never be afforded the opportunity to remove the cloud
which has darkened the plaintiffs reputation and which will continue suspended
over his survivors for their lifetimes." Id. at 1054.
87

89 Id.
90 Id. The court observed that although a reputation can be healed after death,

a leg cannot. Id.
91 Id. at 1057.
92 See id.
93 See id. at 1054-55, 1057.
94 Canino, 96 N.J. at 191, 475 A.2d at 529.
95 Id. at 195, 475 A.2d at 531-32. For an analysis of the Canino decision and its
potential impact, see Comment, Tort Law--Canino v. New York News, Inc.: New
Jersey Permits Defamation Actions to Survive, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 165 (1984).

96 See supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of Cooper and
Alpaugh.
97 See Canino, 96 NJ. at 192-94, 475 A.2d at 530-31.
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cluded, as did the MacDonald court, that the Weller decision repre98
sented "the correct interpretation of the survival statute."
Justice O'Hern, writing for a unanimous court, initially reviewed the probable origins of the rule of actio personalis montur
cum persona and observed that the ancient doctrine "[bore] little
relevance to a modern system of justice."9 9 Quoting extensively
from Ten Eyck, he opined that the survival statute should be interpreted broadly and that the term trespass contained therein was
equivalent to the word tort. 0 0 He concluded that libel is an injury to the person, and therefore a tort, regardless of any allegations of tangible loss.1'
Moreover, Justice O'Hern identified the faulty reasoning in
Alpaugh, 10 2 noting that in that case the court had relied upon
98 See id. at 191, 475 A.2d at 529. See supra text accompanying notes 85-93 for a
discussion of MacDonald.
99 Canino, 96 N.J. at 191-92, 475 A.2d at 529-30. See supra text accompanying
notes 27-40 for a discussion of the common law doctrine. As one commentator has
stated:
One of the oft-sung glories of the English common law is the vitality of
its many rules which evolved originally from ancient custom [and] tradition . . . . This truly amazing vitality has the virtue of imbuing the law
with stability, ...
and of furnishing some measure of predictability of
decisions. Unfortunately, it also serves to perpetuate the force of some
rules far beyond the period of their usefulness and to maintain their
influence after the reason for their existence has been long forgotten.
Smedley, supra note 29, at 605.
100 See Canino, 96 N.J. at 194-95, 475 A.2d at 531. See supra text accompanying
notes 42-52 for a discussion of Ten Eyck. The Canino court also found Ten Eyck
persuasive because the decision conformed to the way the legal system viewed libel
and slander actions. Canino, 96 N.J. at 195, 475 A.2d at 531. A review of the case
law during the period in question indicates that libel was viewed as an action
sounding in trespass on the case. Id. (citingJohnson v. Shields, 25 N.J.L. 116 (Sup.
Ct. 1855); Trenton Mut. Life and Fire Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23 N.J.L. 402 (Sup. Ct.
1852); Joralemon v. Pomeroy, 22 N.J.L. 271 (Sup. Ct. 1849)).
101 Canino, 96 N.J. at 195, 475 A.2d at 531-32.
102 Id. at 193-94, 475 A.2d at 530-31. The Canino court was not the first to express displeasure with the Alpaugh decision. Sixteen years after the Alpaugh decision
was rendered, a law review article, surveying survival statutes in the United States,
stated that
[i]t is difficult to speak with assurance respecting New Jersey. In 1877
the court held that an action for the seduction of a daughter survived
the death of the father. The court in this and in other cases held that
,trespass' was to be interpreted liberally, and meant any tort. The statute provides for survival of actions for any trespass done to the person
or property. In the seduction case the court intimated that perhaps the
father had a property interest, and on that account the action should
survive. Of course there was no direct injury to specific property involved, and from any point of view the construction was a liberal one.
In a later case the court seized upon the suggestion regarding the father's property interest involved in the seduction case, and held that
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Cooper, a decision that concerned an interpretation of the state's
wrongful death statute. 0 3 The Canino court commented that the
reasoning in Cooper-thatit was injury to tangible property rights
that gave a wrongful death action the quality of survivorship04
was irrelevant to an interpretation of the survival statute.1
The supreme court also addressed the argument that survival of defamation actions would be paradoxical in light of current developments in libel law in NewJersey. 0 5 It identified the
competing policy considerations in the case-the free and open
expression of opinion on public affairs and the individual's right
to protect his reputation.'0 6 In balancing those concerns, Justice
O'Hern rejected the contention that survival of libel actions
would restrict the unfettered and robust dissemination of ideas in
the public forum. 10 7 He reasoned simply that "[o]nce a statement is published, the rights of the parties are fixed for good or
[evil]"; the death of the defamed individual can "affect [neither]
the fact of publication" nor the libelous statement. 108 The Canino
court went on to conclude that the decision to permit survival of
actions for libel and slander did not survive, thus overturning the well
established New Jersey view that a trespass to the person meant any tort
action . . . . We are accordingly not confident as to what the law is in
New Jersey, but it seems probable that no actions for the so-called injuries to reputation survive.
Evans, A Comparative Study of the Statutory Survival of Tort Claimsfor and Against Executors and Administrators, 29 MICH. L. REV. 969, 982-83 (1931) (footnotes omitted) (discussing Noice and Alpaugh).
103 Canino, 96 N.J. at 193-94, 475 A.2d at 530-31. See also supra note 65 for a
discussion of the faulty reasoning in Cooper.
104 Canino, 96 N.J. at 194, 475 A.2d at 531.
105 Id. at 196, 475 A.2d at 532; cf. Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J. 176,
445 A.2d 376 (shield law affords newspapermen absolute privilege not to dislose
confidential sources and editorial processes absent conflicting constitutional right),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982); Kotlikoffv. Community News, 89 N.J. 62, 444 A.2d
1086 (1982) (defamatory letter printed in letter to the editor section of newspaper
protected expression of opinion and privileged as fair comment).
Time, Inc., in an amicus curiae brief filed in Canino, argued that the policy considerations advanced in favor of the survival of defamation actions fail to take into
account the uniqueness of those actions and the limitations which have increasingly
been placed on them. Brief Amicus Curiae of Time, Inc. in Support of Motion for
Leave to Intervene as Amicus Curiae and to Participate in Oral Argument at 21,
Canino v. New York News, Inc., 96 N.J. 189, 475 A.2d 528 (1984).
106 See Canino, 96 N.J. at 196-97, 475 A.2d at 532.
107 Id. at 197, 475 A.2d at 532.
108 Id. The Canino court stated that it could not "foresee any behavorial influence
on a free press that the contrary rule [the non-survival of libel actions] would
achieve." Id. As the court queried, "[c]an anyone imagine an editor so hard-bitten
as to weigh the words the less in contemplation of another's death?" Id. at 198, 475
A.2d at 533; accord MacDonald, 554 F. Supp. at 1054.
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libel actions under the statute does not implicate first amendment values. 109

In deciding that defamation actions survive, the Canino court
determined that a damaged reputation is an injury to a person,
which must be redressed regardless of whether the defamed lives
until the final judgment. Rejecting the vestiges of the common
law doctrine, Justice O'Hern analyzed the survival statute in a
manner that reflected both the statute's remedial purpose and
the modern system of justice that exists in New Jersey.
The apparent impetus behind the Canino decision was Judge
Sarokin's analysis in MacDonald with respect to the relationship
between the awesome power of the press and an individual's
right to protect his reputation. Although cognizant of first
amendment values, Judge Sarokin discussed at length the ability
of the press to indict, try, and convict a person with one news
story." 0 He was aware that the rights of persons who have been
injured by the excesses of the media should not be ignored, and
he reasoned that courts must provide a forum for such individuals. "' Both Judge Sarokin and Justice O'Hern recognized that
access to that forum must not be foreclosed by a fortuitous event
such as death. 1 2 As asserted in both Canino and MacDonald "to
say that a man's reputation dies with him is to ignore 'the
realities
3
of life and the bleak legacy which he leaves behind." "1
Several policy considerations were significant to the Canino
and MacDonald courts, including: (1) the expansion of litigants'
rights in tort law;" 4 (2) the necessity of a forum in which to redress the damage to reputation caused by the excesses of a powerful media;" 15 and (3) the concept that a reputation lives on and
109 Canino, 96 N.J. at 198, 475 A.2d at 533. The Canino court reached this conclusion by focusing on the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Calder v.
Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1482 (1984), which held that " '[t]he potential chill on protected
First Amendment activity stemming from libel and defamation actions is already
taken into account in the constitutional limitations on the substantive law governing such suits.' " See Canino, 96 N.J. at 199, 475 A.2d at 533 (quoting Calder, 104
S. Ct. at 1487).
11o See MacDonald, 554 F. Supp. at 1054.
11 See id. at 1054-55.
112 Canino, 96 N.J. at 192, 475 A.2d at 530 (quoting W. PROSSER, supra note 29, at
901); see MacDonald, 554 F. Supp. at 1054.
11 Canino, 96 N.J. at 191, 475 A.2d at 529 (quoting MacDonald, 554 F. Supp. at
1054).
114 MacDonald, 554 F. Supp. at 1057; see Canino, 96 NJ. at 192, 475 A.2d at 530.
115 MacDonald, 554 F. Supp. at 1055; see Canino, 96 N.J. at 196-98, 475 A.2d at
532-33.
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can be vindicated after death." 6 Although Canino and MacDonald
involved an interpretation of the survival statute, the policy considerations that were heeded by the two courts will be pivotal in
the analysis of other substantive issues relating to death and
defamation.
One such issue is whether an individual can maintain an action for the defamation of another person who is libeled after
death." 7 Currently, no state, either by judicial fiat or by statute,
recognizes such actions."18 Denial of these causes of action is
predicated upon a traditional prerequisite of a defamation acton:
it must be brought by and be of and concerning the defamed
individual." 9 Courts reason that a third person who has not
been defamed has no legal interest in bringing the action.' 20
However, recognition that a defamed reputation can be vindicated after death, coupled with the expansion of litigants' rights
to be compensated for injuries to feelings, mandates the conclusion that such actions be allowed. This result would be consistent with the policy 2considerations implicit in the Canino and

MacDonald decisions.' '

Finally, in its zeal to conclude that libel actions survive
death, the Canino court failed to provide guidance as to how
other tort actions involving injuries to feelings and emotions will
be treated under the survival statute. For example, there is no
indication from the supreme court whether actions for malicious
prosecution or alienation of affections are subsumed in the statutory phrase "trespass done to the person." To prevent piece116 MacDonald, 554 F. Supp. at 1054; Canino, 96 N.J. at 191, 475 A.2d at 529
(quoting MacDonald, 554 F. Supp. at 1054).
117 The Canino court noted that this issue was raised in oral argument, but the
court declined to address the issue in its opinion. Canino, 96 N.J. at 195 n.3, 475
A.2d at 532 n.3.
118 E.g., Gruschus v. Curtis Publishing Co., 342 F.2d 775, 776 (10th Cir. 1965)
(under New Mexico law, no cause of action for libel after death); Justice v. Belo
Broadcasting Corp., 472 F. Supp. 145, 148 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (no action for libel
after death in Texas). For a discussion of why these actions have been denied, see
Note, Recent Decisions, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 1065, 1268-69 (1940).
119 See Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. CBS News, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 893
(W.D. Mich. 1980) (crucial element to establish prima facie case for defamation is
that publication must be of and concerning plaintiff); cf. Gnapinsky v. Goldyn, 23
N.J. 243, 128 A.2d 697 (1957) (to be actionable defamation must warrant inference
that statement was understood by third person to reflect upon plaintiff.)
120 See, e.g., Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. CBS News, Inc., 485 F. Supp.
893 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Gnapinsky v. Goldyn, 23 N.J. 243, 128 A.2d 697 (1957).
Law in Evolution, N.J. LAw.,
121 Cf. Gottschalk, When the Dead Are Defamed. ..
Spring 1982, at 10, 13-14 (arguing that actions for libel after death should be allowed in New Jersey).
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meal, and possibly conflicting, adjudication of these issues, the
Legislature should amend the present survival statute-substantially unchanged since 1855' 2 2 -and specifically identify those actions that would survive death and those that would not.
Whatever the ultimate resolution of the tangential questions
concerning death and defamation, what is clear, is that as a result
of the Canino decision, at least with respect to libel actions, there
is life after death in New Jersey.
CherylJ. Oberdorf
Compare 1855 N.J. Laws ch. 126 (original survival statute) with N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A: 15-3, -4 (West Cum. Supp. 1984-1985) (present version of survival statute).
122

